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Abstract 
Many nations have experienced bank failures with very high costs which can lead to systemic risks. The causes of 
bank failure are numerous, in theory, and include regulation of banking activities such as forbearance; asymmetric 
information leading to a moral hazard problem and connected lending. The history of banking system in Nigerian 
has been occasioned with a lot of problem which resulted to distress. The recent consolidation and recapitalisation 
exercise in the sector was in a bid to resolve this dilemma. In this paper we appraised the causes and outcomes of 
bank failures. In this article, we looked at the theoretical level and other root causes, consequences of bank failure 
and lessons within the Nigeria perspective. Finally, the options and measures to prevent further systemic hazards 
were recommended. 
Keyword: bank failure, Nigeria, mismanagement, corruption. 
1. Introduction 
The number of failing banks has been on the increase as reported around the world. Bank failures are usually 
followed by unfavorable consequences on stakeholders outside the failed banks themselves. Sometimes the 
consequences are felt by the non-banking system as a whole. A failure can result in much harm to employment, 
earnings, financial development and other associated public interests. Smith & Walter (1997: 158). According to 
Hooks (1994) and Benston & Kaufman (1996, cited by Kaufman, 1996), the failure of a bank has great adverse 
effect on the economy and so is considered very important. The literature on banking crises identify that the 
conventional banking structure is inherently unstable and, therefore, itself contributes to the occurrence of crisis, 
Bryant (1980); Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Being a deposit taking institution the liabilities of a bank, at any 
given point in time, are fixed and a fixed interest is promised on them. Whereas its assets are in the form of loans 
earning variable interest and subject to credit risk. This also leads to interest rate risk. Similarly, its demand 
deposits by nature are of shorter maturity while its loans are for longer duration. Therefore, there always exists a 
risk of maturity mismatch. These features of the assets and liabilities render the banking sector prone to crisis in 
wake of any shock or decreased confidence of the depositors. 
The failure of banks and the related costs have also been emphasized by many writers. Kaufman (1996) explains 
that banking crisis generates losses to stakeholders by disturbing the settlement system, and even has a systemic 
effect on the entire economy. Caprio & Klingebiel (1999) also present information on 114 episodes of banking 
crises in 46 countries. Given the focus on a Ghanaian bank, we think that the costs of failures of some African 
banks (table 1) might be of particular interest. The costs of the failures shown in the table differ from country to 
country. Different costs are included in total cost differently by each country. Examples of such costs are those 
related to corporate restructuring and restructuring/recapitalization of the banking system. The estimated total 
losses/costs shown in this table exclude the portion incurred by depositors and borrowers from non-performing 
loans. Additionally, some of the figures exclude costs related to indirect methods used to bail out banks. Most 
empirical studies on banking failures consider a financial institution (bank) to have failed if it either received 
external support or was directly closed. Here, a financial institution will be considered to have failed if it fits into 
any of the following categories (Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri 2001; Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1999); the financial 
institution was recapitalized by either the central bank or an agency specifically created to address the crisis, 
and/or required a liquidity injection from the monetary authority;  the financial institution’s operations were 
temporarily suspended (“frozen”) by the government;  the government closed the financial institution; the financial 
institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution. These categories involve a broader concept of 
economic failure than the more restrictive concept of de jure failure (closure). One potential limitation is that 
category (iv) could include banks that were merged or absorbed for strategic reasons during the crisis period, and 
not due to insolvency reasons. As a result, a sensitivity analysis is performed that excludes this category. 
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2. A Literature Review on Causes of Bank Failure  
It is useful for all stakeholders, that is, managers, depositors, borrowers and regulators in the financial sector to 
know what causes a bank failure in order to help prevent the failure. The issue especially concerns managers and 
external regulators. This is because most managers are dismissed and regulators are blamed when banks fail. It is 
also very important for other stakeholders to understand the causes of bank failure, in order for them to help to 
avoid it. We should also note that the social costs of the failure of a bank can be higher than the costs incurred by 
the failed institution, the consumer can lose when an institution fails, even if there is no systemic impact and this is 
the reason why all the interested party should be at alert regarding issues of bank failure. In this section, we will 
examine and review some of the various theories which deal on the factors behind banking crisis and failures. 
They are as follows: 
Deteriorating Economic Factors 
Hooks (1994: 5) points out that deteriorating local economic conditions (e.g. inflation, interest rates, and exchange 
rates) cause bank failure. Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994: 10) adds that macroeconomic factors (e.g. 
sudden adverse movements in a country’s terms of trade and sharp fluctuations in world interest rates, real 
exchange rates and inflation rates) worsened by regulations that are imposed on banks result in a bank failure. Like 
Hooks and Eisenbeis, Goodhart et al. (1998: 47) emphasize that interest rate fluctuations contribute to banking 
crisis. 
Regulation of Banks 
O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks 1994: 9), Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994: 10), Dothan & Williams 
(1980, cited by Hooks, 1994: 36) share the opinion that government intervention causes bank distress. Hempel & 
Simonson (1999: 17) state that when governments intervene in saving banks from failing, creditors and customers 
tend to rely on the government to protect their interests. The intervention, however, is a disincentive for other 
institutions, creditors and customers to effectively monitor their interests in banks in an independent way. 
Llewellyn (1996, cited by Goodhart et al., 1998: 2-3) notes the following situations, which could cause a bank 
failure: (i) Too many stringent rules could cause banks to disregard the measures as they may be seen by the 
banking sector as superfluous. (ii) Some dangers that banks are exposed to may be too difficult to be addressed by 
general laws. (iii) A rigid system of rules could inhibit banks from selecting the most efficient means of achieving 
regulatory goals set for them and may serve as a disincentive for improvement. While Spollen (1997: 28) 
concludes that ineffective regulatory system causes bank failure, White (1984, cited by Hooks, 1994:3, 36) also 
notes that government regulation is neither needed nor advantageous. 
Government Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 45) observe that in the absence of any measure to rescue distressed banks, they could be 
exposed to depositors’ runs. However, when complete deposit insurance schemes and other rescue measures are in 
place, stakeholders other than banks are discouraged from controlling the activities of intermediaries. This is why 
regulators protect the interest of the public by encouraging the reduction of risk-seeking behaviors. Kareken (1981, 
1983, cited by Hooks, 1994: 3) and Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited by Hooks, 1994) state that a fixed-rate 
deposit insurance motivates banks to engage in risky investment activities. Hooks (1994: 39) agrees with the 
above by stating that a flat-rate fee deposit insurance is an incentive for banks to make risky investments. 
Palubinskas & Stough (1999) stress that the scheme results in unpaid loans, since banks and customers have 
nothing at stake when deposits are badly managed or lost through fraudulent actions. White (1993: 108-109) 
concludes that a government deposit insurance scheme encourages unskilled management and fraudsters, 
irrespective of the regulation. 
Regulation as Regards Putting a Ceiling on Deposit Interest Rates 
Selgin (1996: 211) states that the purpose of putting a ceiling on deposit interest rates is to prevent banks from 
mobilizing deposits by giving borrowers big amounts of funds with high interest income to the bank. Dothan & 
Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994: 36) state that a limit on deposit interest rates motivates banks to make risky 
investments. Additionally, banks often try to overrule the ceiling by rendering more services to depositors, which 
results in higher transaction costs and lower income. Selgin (1996: 211) concludes that instead of decreasing the 
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prospects of bank failures, the ceiling reduces a bank’s capability to mobilize funds when it becomes illiquid. A 
ceiling on deposit and loan interest rates, therefore, it is argued, can cause bank failure. 
Prohibition of Banks from Establishing Branches and Limiting Bank Investments 
Selgin (1996: 200) states that geographical limitations pose significant threats to banks. Additionally, such 
limitations result in the following situations, which may cause bank failure: a bank’s vulnerability to different 
threats is raised; systemic risk is encouraged and private market forces are hindered from preventing failures. 
Hooks (1994: 8, 49-50) observes that branching restrictions could constrain banks from spreading their investment 
activities in different locations. These geographic restrictions, coupled with prohibition from investments, result in 
unsuccessful diversification by banks. Hooks also notes that limiting a bank’s investment chances could lower its 
diversification operations. Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) add that lack of appropriate diversification causes bank 
failure. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 18) argue that without branches, banks cannot mobilize substantial amounts 
of stable retail deposits. Such a position compels banks to rely extensively on unstable funding bases attracted 
from money market creditors. O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks, 1994: 9) observes that banks may use flexible 
investment freedom to focus on limited higher-risk categories. Selgin (1996: 210) adds that even though the 
justification of geographical limitation is to stop banks from excessive clustering and avoid competition, this 
perception misinterprets the impact of bank branching and the importance of competition. White (1986, cited by 
Selgin, 1996: 209) states that branching limitation raises a bank’s vulnerability to risks for its liabilities as well as 
its assets. In the same way that branching restrictions rules have motivated banks to high risk-taking investments, 
some regulations have also constrained banks from engaging in many different banking operations. Selgin (1996: 
208) concludes that regulation in respect of branching limitation contributes to the possibility of banks failing, by 
constraining their chances to prevent risk and by supporting bank risky operations. To him, the worst regulation is 
branching restriction. 
Capital Requirements 
The lower a bank’s capital, the higher the probability of its failure (Polizatto, year not given). Goodhart et al. 
(1998: xvii, 49, 57) agree with this statement and add that as a bank’s capital decreases, the higher its motivation 
for actions towards survival. This leads to more dangerous risk-taking operations. Therefore, the risk of failure 
rises with the decline of equity. Palubinskas & Stough (1999) also observe that one of the measures used to stop 
the increase of bank crisis is to increase the ceiling as regards capital held by banks. This requirement compels 
banks to hold much capital, or combine their businesses with other banks, or forfeit their licenses. According to 
Polizatto (year not given) capital is essential to cushion losses incurred by banks. When banks have inadequate 
capital, they usually conceal the situation for fear of exposing the illiquidity. If stakeholders such as bank 
management and regulators do not effectively address a capital erosion situation early, it could result in 
bankruptcy. A similar view as the above has been expressed by Goodhart et al. (1998: 57) who state that adequate 
funds reduce risk-taking while insufficient capital motivates banks to engage in actions towards survival at all 
costs. 
Inadequate Reserve Requirements  
A reserve requirement is a portion of cash to total deposits which banks are obliged to maintain. This ensures 
prudential and fiscal control of the activities of banks (www.bog.gov.gh). White (1999) adds that a government 
obliges banks to reserve the funds in order to improve the actual need for base money. Friedman (1960, cited by 
Hooks, 1994: 37) states that bank failures arise because banks do not keep all their deposits in statutory reserve 
funds. 
Forbearance 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 18) note that some regulatory bodies exercise forbearance. This contributes to bank 
crisis by permitting distressed banks to continue their operations instead of liquidating them. This action aims at 
assisting banks to make profits. Its effect is rather disadvantageous to banks because usually when banks lack 
adequate funds, and remain in operation, their capital situation deteriorates (Hempel & Simonson, 1999: 18). 
Lender of Last Resort 
Selgin (1996: 214) and White (1999: 74-77) state that governments use the lender of last resort mechanism to help 
some stakeholders of banks which are failing. When bank failures rise, any money reserved to deal with the 
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situation decreases. The only option then is to either replenish the reserves or combine the operations of distressed 
banks. However, if prospective beneficiaries of this approach perceive that the central bank may intervene when 
every bank fails, the measure could rather encourage banks to engage in more risky activities. 
Mismanagement 
Management is a key to a successful business. Mismanagement caused many banks to fail in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Banking crisis mostly comes from the absence of good managerial ideas in management decision-making. 
Therefore, competence and focus play a major role in banking (Spiegel, et al. 1996: 51). According to Pantalone & 
Platt (1987, cited by Hooks, 1994: 41- 42), mismanagement, especially excessive risk-taking, is the main cause of 
bank failure. On the other hand, White (1993: 110) notes that even though bankers are accused of misconduct, it is 
difficult to prove that the negligence of management is the only cause of bank failure. Spollen (1997: 25-26, 32, 
51) has however, listed the following as underlying the failure of businesses which, to us, are also relevant to the 
purpose of this study: 
• Inability of management to appreciate and control a business. 
• Inability of management to ensure compliance with laid down procedures. In many situations where there is a 
loss of a business, the failure is attributed to either lack of policies, and if policies existed at all, they are 
inadequate or existing policies are not observed.  
• Insufficient number of staff, particularly middle management, which can subject a small number of 
employees to over-time work, which could eventually result in the failure of a bank. The issue is whether an 
organization has adequate staff complement and whether it appreciates their interests and addresses them 
(Spollen 1997: 86, 94). 
• The situation when fundamental control procedures are ignored. 
• The situation when internal audit does not play its role in the formulation of a board of directors’ policy and 
its procedures. 
• The situation when the board of directors does not effectively address audit queries. 
• Over-reliance on one member of staff. Most of the time organizations are defrauded by some of their own 
workers, mostly those who have been with organizations for long periods of time and whose work is not 
supervised. Excessive authority is given to an employee because he seems to be very effective on his 
schedule. Individuals in this category are trusted, devoted to duty and work extra hours under the guise of 
showing much commitment Spollen (1997: 20, 34-36, 90-91). Like Spollen, Heffernan (1996: 282-288) 
states a practical case of such a situation that contributed to the failure of Barings Bank. 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 49) add that if worker compensation is tied to performance and output is below expectation, 
the managers could manipulate the output for fear of being dismissed. This risk behavior could eventually cause a 
bank to fail (e.g., Barings Bank failure). Palubinskas & Stough (1999) state that a shortage of competent bankers 
as regards loans’ risk appraisal, scrutiny of financial information of customers, appraisal of cash flow, or 
calculation of fundamental profitability, contributes to many of the loan defaults. They continue saying that lack of 
skills leads to a situation where there is no credit evaluation - where bankers only enforce and supervise the credit 
manual, which is not updated to reflect varying periods. Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) agree with this perception. 
White (1993: 110) notes that currently it is not easy for banks to attract skilled managers. 
Fraud and Corruption 
Smith & Walter (1997: 157) stated that fraud causes banks to fail as happened in the case of Banco Ambrosiano, 
BCCI, Crédit Lyonnais and Herstatt. Heffernan (1996: 293) adds that corruption and fraud have been the general 
causes of many failed banks. White (1993: 108-109) argues that bank failures are seen by many to be caused by 
mismanagement, fraud and deregulation. However, fraud is not the primary cause of banking crisis, since 
according to White, bank failures were rampant in the 1930s when there was no fraud. 
Poor Risk Management Procedures Such as Lending Practices of Banks 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 388) state that the main activity of bank management is not deposit mobilization and 
giving credit. Effective credit administration reduces the risk of customer default. The competitive advantage of a 
bank is dependent on its capability to handle credit risk valuably. Bad loans cause bank failure. Palubinskas & 
Stough (1999) note that the failure of a bank is mainly seen as a result of mismanagement because of bad lending 
decisions made with respect to wrong appraisal of credit status, or the repayment of non-performing credits and 
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excessive focus on giving loans to certain customers. Goodhart et al. (1998: xvii, 38) also state that poor credit 
control, which results in undue credit risk, causes bank failure. Goodhart et al. (1998: xvii, 38) connected lending 
to the causes of bank failure. Again, Palubinskas & Stough (1999) note that lack of dependable financial 
information on borrowers to help in assessing creditworthiness causes a bank failure. Yet mismanagement is not a 
result of immaturity all the time. Most of the time, principals and agents know that major faults in the banking 
regulation in respect of internal changes permit them to exploit a bank’s funds. Sometimes these two groups of 
stakeholders attempt to accomplish their short term earnings objectives by acquiring high risks in the bank. 
Polizatto (year not given) points out that financial information disclosed by banks is often false. He explains that 
the absence of existing and adequate financial data underlies the keeping of security based credit because bankers 
are unable to assess creditworthiness. Goodhart et al. (1998: 49) state that re-stating financial earnings from 
previous years to current years could lead to the falsity of financial information of banks. 
Polizatto again observes that in many cases asymmetric information exists between banks and investors. Goodhart 
et al. (1998: 13-14, 46) also add that the common problem of prudential rules is the asymmetric information issue 
between the customer and the bank. Heffernan (1996: 2, 22) adds that bank structures generate asymmetric 
information leading to moral hazard and adverse selection. These writers further state that organizations give 
extended agreements whose worth to the customer is based on the organization’s attitudes and performance 
subsequent to the date of the agreement. The problem and rigidity of rules are because every stakeholder (e.g. 
government, bank, depositor and borrower) has dissimilar information, incentives and positions. For instance, how 
can savers or the government discern the risk actions of banks? If the authorities could monitor the total risks of an 
intermediary inadequately, is it feasible to initiate laws that minimize runs on banks? 
Spollen (1997: 9, 30, 58-60) states that irregular meetings of loans committees, false loans, large treasury losses, 
high sums of unrecorded deposits and money laundering in large amounts, contribute to bank failure. He adds that 
some lending decisions involving high amounts of money are made by an individual worker because of the status 
of the recipients of the loans. Kindleberger (1989, cited by Hooks, 1994: 37-38) observes that over-investment is 
directly related to high risk-taking and this causes bank failure. Additionally, some employees disregard laid down 
procedures and rather work according to instructions from certain areas. In some cases a worker of a Credit 
Department of a bank obtains signatures from every member of the loan committee in irregular ways sanctioning a 
loan. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 16-17) mention loans to the “energy producers and commercial real estate 
developers” as examples of risky investments, especially when the economy is good and the lending decision is 
based on improper projection. White (1993: 12) adds that the failure of banks is mainly due to risky credits they 
give. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 390) conclude that all banks incur certain loan losses when some borrowers 
default in repaying their loans. Irrespective of the extent of the risk involved, good credit management can reduce 
the default. 
Deregulation of Banks 
Hooks (1994: 3-4) states that deregulation results in higher risk-taking by banks and could lead to bank failure. 
Chu (1996) emphasizes that free banking encourages banks to engage in deceptive operations and over-expansion, 
which makes banks fail. With respect to deposit insurance schemes, Kareken (1981, 1983, cited by Hooks, 1994) 
notes that deregulation is unsafe for banks. He explains that when banks have freedom of investment and 
diversification, the situation leads to higher risk-taking. Like Kareken, Hooks (1994: 49) adds that if regulatory 
authorities eliminate the application of strict maximum deposit interest rates imposed on banks, resulting in the 
increase of deposit interest rates, banks will engage in high risk investments. He therefore concludes that 
deregulation results in more risky investments. 
Political Interference 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) point out that politically directed lending leads to banking crisis. To buttress this 
assertion, Caprio & Honohan (1999) observe that governments can cause banks to fail in many ways. Some 
dishonest leaders exploit the funds of banks as happened in the Philippines in the 1980s. In most cases, 
governments influenced banks to give loans to certain borrowers that discouraged banks from properly assessing 
the creditworthiness of borrowers and eventually destabilized banks’ financial standing. The implication of this is 
that such loans are not paid off. Occasionally, the credits are given to government suppliers leading to the failure 
of the banks involved.   
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3.0 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BANK FAILURES 
3.1.Biggest Global Bank Failures 
Many important industrial nations have experienced upsetting bank failures such as the following: Banco 
Ambrosiano in Italy (Smith & Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 272-273), Barings Bank in the United 
Kingdom (Gray et al., 2001: 23-24; Heffernan, 1996: 282-288), Rumasa in Spain (Caprio & Honohan, 1999), 
Crédit Lyonnais in France (Smith & Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 387-406; and Daiwa Bank in Japan 
(www.lectlaw.com). The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), founded in Karachi, Pakistan in 
1971 and once the 7th largest private bank in the world and holding over $20 billion USD in assets failed in July 
1991 because of widespread fraud (Smith & Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 280-282).  
 Herstatt Bank of Germany has a special place in bank failure lore, triggering a debacle that resulted in a new 
international regulation. German regulators seized the ailing Herstatt and forced it to liquidate on June 26, 1974. 
The same day, other banks had released Deutsch Mark payments to Herstatt, which was supposed to exchange 
those payments for US dollars that would then be sent to New York. Regulators seized the bank after it received its 
DM payments, but before the US dollars could be delivered. The time zone difference meant that the banks 
sending the money never received their US dollars.(Smith & Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 271). There is 
also the case of Hokkaidō Takushoku Bank, Ltd. Japan which is possibly the most notable failure of the Asian 
financial crisis, “Hokutaku” went bankrupt in 1997, almost 100 years after its inception as a “special bank” To 
Promote development on the island of Hokkaido. The bank specialized in long term, low-interest loans and debt 
insurance that would help grow specific sectors on the island, like fishing and agriculture. In 1939, the government 
deregulated Hokutaku, allowing it to offer short-term financing and bank accounts. The bank grew and eventually 
became involved in risky real estate investments during Japan’s late-1980s real estate bubble. In 1991, the 
Southeast Bank of Miami, the second largest bank in Florida failed. This was caused by a slump in the regional 
commercial real estate market, combined with 1980s S&L Crisis fallout. Also in December of 1931, New York’s 
Bank of the United States fell victim to “contagion,” when a string of unrelated banks fail for unrelated reasons. 
The bank’s name had something to do with it. Many New Yorkers felt that if the bank of the United States could 
fail, then any bank could fail. At the time of the collapse, the bank had over $200 million in deposits, making it the 
largest single bank failure in the nation’s history. There is also the case of Franklin Square National Bank, founded 
in 1926, the bank piloted now-standard features such as hiring high school students as tellers, building drive-up 
teller windows, and offering bank credit cards. The bank’s integrity went out the window when shady financier 
Michele “The Shark” Sindona purchased a controlling stake. Sindona used Franklin to launder money and build a 
Mafia-linked banking empire in the United States. Within two years, currency speculation, bad loans, and fraud 
drove Franklin into a fire sale. While the Great Depression may not have affected European banks as badly as 
those in the U.S., the Creditanstalt-Vienna is one notable example of a large healthy bank that failed. Founded by 
the Rothchild family in 1855, Creditanstalt became the largest bank in Austria-Hungary. A poor economy and 
failure to deal with dwindling deposits forced it into bankruptcy in 1931. Its failure sent shockwaves through in 
Europe, causing bank failures in Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan LTCB was one of the top three banks in Japan responsible for postwar economic growth. In 1989, it was 
considered the 9th largest company in the world by asset value. Then Japan’s asset bubble burst, poisoning LTCB 
with more than $19.2 billion in bad debt. In 1998, the Japanese government nationalized LTCB, and then 
restructured it as a commercial bank named Shinsei Bank. (www.businesspundit.com/25-biggest-bank-
failures). 
Sachsen LB, Germany, in August of 2007, board members reported that even though Sachsen was involved in Irish 
and US mortgage markets, they were not exposed to sub-prime loans and held sufficient liquidity for the long term. 
Then, in September, worldwide markets crashed. Within the next three months, most of the board was fired or 
resigned. Inside consultants accused Sachsen LB of blatant accounting errors and no “visible action” to reduce 
risks. On the 13th of December 2007, Sachsen LB was taken over by Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW), 
with financial guarantees of roughly EUR2.75 billion by the state of Saxony. Bank of New England (BNE), along 
with its two sister banks, Maine National Bank and Connecticut Bank and Trust, failed on January 6, 1991. In a 
surprising move for the time, the FDIC decided to insure all deposits- even if they exceeded the $100,000 
insurance limit. BNE was the largest bank in the New England area. With its sister banks, it had assets totaling 
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$21.8 billion and deposits totaling $19 billion. Bad loans and heavy ties with bond creditors BNE led to its 
downfall. A settlement provided $140 million to creditors.  Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust, The 
concept of “too big to fail” started with Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust. In 1984, it was the 6th 
largest bank in the U.S., with nearly $40 billion in assets. The bank collapsed in 1984 due to losses stemming from 
recently acquired Penn Square Bank. In response, the FDIC infused capital and bought preferred shares, basically 
nationalizing the bank. Continental’s huge number of assets, which included the largest commercial and industrial 
loan portfolio in the country, made it too big to fail. In addition to giving guarantees to depositors, the FDIC 
infused billions of dollars to recapitalize the bank. IndyMac, Los Angeles-based IndyMac used to be the largest 
loan originator in the country. Founded in 1995 as Countrywide Mortgage Investment, IndyMac fueled its 
aggressive growth through risky loan products like Alt-A mortgages, concentrating on inflated real estate markets 
like California and Florida, and relying heavily on borrowed funds, especially from the FHLB (Federal Home 
Loan Bank).  The U.S. woke up to the first and largest bank failure in recent memory on July 11, 2008, when the 
FDIC seized the bank’s assets (over $30 billion) and closed its doors, (www.businesspundit.com/25-biggest-
bank-failures). 
3.2 Bank Failures in Nigeria – An Overview 
The health of Nigerian banks cannot be divorced from their antecedents. As could be recalled, when modern banking 
business commenced in Nigeria by 1892, it was solely a business for foreigners. The skewness in the ownership 
structure in favour of foreigners largely contributed to the observed lack of access to banks' credit by indigenous 
Nigerian entrepreneur during that period. Nigerian entrepreneurs who came into banking from the late 1920s to early 
1950s did so with the principal aim of redressing the situation and meeting the financial requirements of Nigerian 
businesses. Due to problems such as inadequate capital, mismanagement, overtrading, lack of regulation and unfair 
competition from the foreign-owned banks, 21 of the 25 indigenous banks that were established up to 1954 failed. The 
failures were resolved mainly through self-liquidation. The mass bank failure was a bitter experience for the economy 
as it brought untold hardship to depositors who lost their money and lost confidence in the ability of Nigerians to 
manage a banking business.  
It was not until government started to regulate banking through the Banking Ordinance of 1952 and the establishment 
of the Central Bank in 1959, which was followed by the promulgation of the Banking Degree of 1969 that the banking 
system started to stabilise in the country. The oil boom, which commenced in 1973, and the economic growth, which 
ensued, made banking to thrive and to be very lucrative. The economic downturn, noticeable from mid-1981, brought 
strains to the Nigerian economy that soon became depressed. As economic agents were not able to moderate their boom 
consumption habits in line with the realities of the depressed economy, the financial condition of individuals, firms and 
governments worsened and they were unable to honour their contractual obligations of loan repayment to banks thus 
impairing banks’ portfolio quality. This economic predicament, combined with other factors such as mismanagement, 
adversely affected the health of many banks. Tables 1 and 2 below show the trend of bank liquidation and acquisition. 
Table 1: Banks Under Liquidation As At December 2009 
S/N  BANK IN LIQUIDATION   DATE OF CLOSURE  REMARKS 
1  Financial Merchant Bank Ltd   21-Jan-1994 
2  Kapital Merchant Bank Ltd   21-Jan-1994 
3  Alpha Merchant Bank Plc    8-Sep-1994 
4  United Commercial Bank Ltd   8-Sep-1994 
5  Republic Bank Limited    29-Jun-1995 
6  Abacus Merchant Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
7  ABC Merchant Bank Ltd    16-Jan-1998  
8  Allied Bank of Nigeria Plc   16-Jan-1998 
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9  Amicable Bank of Nigeria Plc   16-Jan-1998 
10  Century Merchant Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
11  Commerce Bank Plc    16-Jan-1998 
12  Commercial Trust Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
13  Continental Merchant Bank Plc   16-Jan-1998 
14  Cooperative & Commerce Bank Ltd  16-Jan-1998 
15  Credite Bank of Nigeria Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
16  Crown Merchant Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
17  Great Merchant Bank Ltd    16-Jan-1998 
18 Group Merchant Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
19 Highland Bank of Nigeria Plc   16-Jan-1998 
20 ICON (Merchant Bankers) Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
21 Ivory Merchant Bank Ltd    16-Jan-1998 
22 Lobi Bank of Nigeria Ltd    16-Jan-1998 
23 Mercantile Bank of Nigeria Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
24  Merchant Bank for Africa Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
25  Nigeria Merchant Bank Plc   16-Jan-1998 
26  North-South Bank Limited   16-Jan-1998 
27  Pan African Bank Limited   16-Jan-1998 
28  Pinacle Commercial Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
29 Prime Merchant Bank Ltd  16-Jan-1998 
30 Progress Bank of Nigeria Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
31 Royal Merchant Bank Ltd  16-Jan-1998 
32 Victory Merchant Bank Ltd   16-Jan-1998 
33  Premier Commercial Bank Ltd   20-Dec-2000 
34  Rims Merchant Bank Ltd    20-Dec-2000 
35  Peak Merchant Bank Ltd    28-Feb-2003   Under Litigation 
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36  Allstates Trust Bank Plc    16-Jan-2006 
37  Afex Bank Limited    16-Jan-2006 
38  Assurance Bank Nig. Limited   16-Jan-2006 
39  City Express Bank Plc    16-Jan-2006 
40 Eagle Bank Limited    16-Jan-2006 
41  Fortune International Bank Plc   16-Jan-2006   Under Litigation 
42  Gulf Bank Plc     16-Jan-2006 
43  Hallmark Bank Plc    16-Jan-2006 
44  Lead Bank Plc     16-Jan-2006  
45  Liberty Bank Plc     16-Jan-2006 
46  Metropolitan Bank Limited   16-Jan-2006 
47  Trade Bank Plc     16-Jan-2006 
48  Triumph Bank Limited    16-Jan-2006   Under Litigation 
Source: NDIC Annual Report 2009 
Table 2. Closed Banks Under Purchase and Assumption (P&A) 
S/N CLOSED BANKS ASSUMING BANK HANDOVER DATES 
1 Afex Bank Plc UBA Plc 9 October 2007 
2 Allstates Trust Bank Plc ECOBANK Plc 16 October 2006 
3 Assurance Bank Nig. Ltd Afribank Plc 16 August 2006 
4 City Express Bank Ltd UBA Plc 9 July 2007 
5 Eagle Bank Ltd Zenith Bank Plc 14 January 2008 
6 Gulf Bank Plc UBA Plc 14 January 2008 
7 Hallmark Bank Plc ECOBANK PLC 24 July 2007 
8 Lead Bank Plc Afribank Plc 11 August 2006 
9 Liberty Bank Ltd UBA PLC 23 June 2008 
10 Metropolitan Bank Ltd UBA Plc 11 June 2007 
11 Trade Bank Plc UBA Plc 15 January 2007 
Source: NDIC Annual Report 2009 
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4. Consequence of Bank Failures  
According to a number of empirical studies, examine not only what causes crises but also how crises affect the rest 
of the economy. For example, summarizing several case studies, Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) conclude that 
bank fragility has adversely affected economic growth. Measures of output loss relative to trend during financial 
crises have been used to compare the severity of these events. For instance, Bordo et al (2001) show that financial 
crises (currency crises, banking crises, or both) entailed similar-sized output losses in recent years as compared to 
previous historical periods. Crises, however, are more frequent now than during the gold standard and Bretton 
Woods periods, and are as frequent now as in the interwar years. Hoggarth et al (2002) make the point that output 
losses associated with banking crises are not more severe in developing countries than in developed countries.  
An obvious question raised by these studies is whether causality goes from output losses to banking crises or the 
other way around. The answer has obvious policy implications: if crises indeed have real costs, then the case for 
generous bank rescue operations is strengthened, even though these policies have large fiscal costs and adverse 
incentive effects ex ante. Conversely, if the output slowdown is mainly the result of exogenous shocks, then 
bailouts might not be beneficial. Sorting out causality, however, is a challenging task. As the literature surveyed in 
the preceding section shows, crises are accompanied by worsening macroeconomic performance triggered by 
adverse shocks, such as a tightening of monetary policy, the end of a credit boom, or a sudden stop in foreign 
capital inflows. A distressed banking sector, in turn, may be a serious obstacle to economic activity and aggravate 
the effect of adverse shocks. For instance, when banks are distressed, firms may be unable to obtain credit to deal 
with a period of low internal cash flow. In fact, lack of credit may force viable firms into bankruptcy. Similarly, 
lack of consumer credit may worsen declines in consumption and aggregate demand during a recession, 
aggravating unemployment. In extreme cases, bank runs and bank failures can threaten the soundness of the 
payment system, making transactions more difficult and expensive. These mechanisms suggest that fragile banks 
hinder economic activity (the credit crunch hypothesis). 
On the other hand, there are several channels through which exogenous adverse shocks to the economy might 
cause a decline in credit and economic activity even if the banking sector itself is relatively healthy. For instance, 
adverse shocks may trigger a fall in aggregate demand, leading firms to cut production and investment and 
consequently, credit demand. Increased uncertainty may also cause firms to delay investment and borrowing 
decisions.  Finally, adverse shocks might worsen agency problems and complicate lending relationships, for 
instance by reducing the net worth of borrowers. This, in turn, might cause banks to abandon high risk borrowers 
(flight to quality) or raise lending spreads. So output and bank credit may decelerate around banking crises even if 
there is no feedback effect from bank distress to credit availability. Existing studies of individual country 
experiences have found conflicting evidence on the relationship between bank distress and real activity. In a study 
of the so-called capital crunch in the United States in 1990, Bernanke and others (1991) argue that a shortage of 
bank capital had little to do with the recession. Domaç and Ferri (1999) reached the opposite conclusion for 
Malaysia and Korea during 1997–8. They found small and medium-sized firms to have suffered more than large 
firms during the crisis. Since these firms are usually more dependent on bank credit than large firms, this is 
evidence of a credit crunch. Data from a survey of Thai firms, on the other hand, suggest that poor demand rather 
than lack of credit caused the decline in production, although many firms complained about high interest rates 
(Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000). For Indonesia and Korea, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) test an aggregate 
model of credit demand and supply and find evidence of a credit crunch, but only in the first few months of the 
crisis. Finally, using firm-level data from Korea, Borensztein and Lee (2002) show that firms belonging to 
industrial groups (chaebols) lost their preferential access to credit during the banking crisis, although this was not 
necessarily evidence of a credit crunch. 
A few studies have used cross-country empirical analysis to study which intervention policies can minimize the 
costs of a banking crisis. This question is as important to policymakers as it is difficult to answer through 
empirical analysis. One problem is that compiling accurate information on intervention policies for a large enough 
sample of crises is a laborious task. Another difficulty is that the sequence, timing, and specific modalities of a 
bank support strategy are crucial to the outcome, and it is difficult to capture these complex dimensions through 
quantitative measures of policies. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) construct a database with estimates of the fiscal 
cost of 40 banking crises and catalogue the policies adopted in each episode, classified according to five broad 
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categories: blanket guarantees to depositors, liquidity support to banks, bank recapitalization, financial assistance 
to debtors, and forbearance. With this database, the authors explore how the different intervention policies affect 
the fiscal cost of the bailout, after controlling for country and crisis characteristics. They conclude that more 
generous bailouts resulted in higher fiscal costs. 
Further evidence on the determinants of the fiscal costs of crises is provided by Keefer (2001), who focuses on the 
political economy of crises resolution. He finds that when voters are better informed, elections are close, and the 
number of veto players is large, governments make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are less 
likely to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions. Thus, transparency, information 
dissemination, and competition among interest groups play an important role is shaping crisis response policies. In 
Nigeria, unethical practices, regulatory failure, poor governance structure, small capital base, macro-economic 
instability caused by large and sudden capital inflows and weaknesses in the business environment were some of 
the factors that triggered the weak financial system. The current CBN Governor admitted that internal structure 
within the Apex bank was weak. While Professor Charles Soludo, the former CBN Boss, tried to resolve the 
capital inadequacy by recapitalizing Nigeria banks the Governance issues in banks and at the Apex banks were not 
adequately handled. Unchecked governance malpractices at consolidation within the banks became a way of life 
with Chairman/CEO possessing unfetter powers over the bank. The board committees were inactive maybe 
because ‘the cake’ in their mouths couldn’t make them talk. It was also discovered in the recent bank examination 
conducted that several abnormalities were done in the consolidation exercise. Mallam Sanusi put it this way: “One 
bank borrowed money and purchased private jets which we later discovered were registered in the name of the 
CEO’s son. In another bank the management set up 100 fake companies for the purpose of perpetrating fraud. A 
lot of the capital supposedly raised by these so called “mega banks” was fake capital financed from depositors’ 
funds. 30% of the share capital of Intercontinental bank was purchased with customer deposits. Afribank used 
depositors’ funds to purchase 80% of its IPO. It paid N25 per share when the shares were trading at N11 on the 
NSE and these shares later collapsed to under N3. The CEO of Oceanic bank controlled over 35% of the bank 
through SPVs borrowing customer deposits. The collapse of the capital market wiped out these customer deposits 
amounting to hundreds of billions of naira. The Central Bank had a process of capital verification at the beginning 
of consolidation to avoid bubble capital. For some unexplained reason, this process was stopped. As a result, there 
were a lot of malpractices which led to the discovery that many banks never raised the capital they claimed they 
did (Okubadejo, 2010). 
5. Conclusion, Lessons and Recommendations 
Bank failures and financial crises are economic hazards. While their direct economic costs are the dead-weight 
loss. The indirect costs in the form of derailed economic policies and damage to the growth of banking and finance 
are even greater. There are many other causes that are common with conventional banking industry. We have 
experienced cases of exchange rate shock coupled with liquidity crunch and eroded depositor confidence in the 
banking system which precipitated a run on banks in Nigeria. Stakeholders should be on alert to pre-empt some 
symptoms of distress as indicated by Ogunleye (1993), they include; late submission of returns to the regulatory 
authorities, falsification of returns, rapid staff turnover, frequent top management changes, inability to meet 
obligations as and when due, use of political influence, petitions /anonymous letters, persistent adverse clearing 
position, borrowing at desperate rates, persistent contravention of laid-down rules and persistent overdrawn 
current account position at the CBN. 
Banks also have to be careful not to invest in any interest bearing asset, even if this means foregoing lucrative 
short-term investment opportunities. This will not only ensure their stability at the time of financial crisis but also 
increase their credibility with the depositors. Measures which are taken by banks for ensuring its liquidity needs 
may not be enough during the time of crisis and this calls for collective efforts, pooling of liquidity, and reaching 
out for outside institutional support if need be. In equity based financing it is natural for the funds to flow where 
monitoring costs are lowest. Therefore banks tend to invest in their affiliated and connected companies where their 
control is greatest. In doing this, the banks should be careful not to increase maturity and currency mismatch 
between assets and liabilities. It is very easy to increase such risks because the banks’ interests get locked in with 
these firms. 
There should be some criteria for membership in the Board of Directors of Banks so that those selected are people 
who have sense of responsibility towards improving corporate governance in the institution.  They should not be 
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rubber stamp members and should have knowledge of the financial and economic facts and experience of working 
in the financial sector. They should also be well informed of the country specific and international regulatory rules 
and laws which have implications for the bank, and above all, people of proven and impeccable integrity. 
Moreover, in order to minimize the effect distress on banks clientele and the economy as a hole and also avoid the 
encroachment of the factors responsible for distress into the banking system, the regulatory authorities may have 
to use better measures of evaluating the features of distress at an early stage. This will no doubt create sufficient 
lead-time to apply remediable solution before serious damage is done. The Apex banks should also put in place 
procedure to ensure that credits are only granted to credit worthy customers. Credit scoring systems of banks 
should be integrated with the Apex bank’s Credit Rating Management System (CRMS). Let’s ask if the CRMS of 
the Apex bank is even working effectively? Credit scoring agencies should be made CBN consultants and be paid 
by the Apex Bank. By so doing, they have regulatory backing. Data capturing should be robust and reflects high 
level of integrity. Governments must also move more quickly to balance their budgets, although, this is easier said 
than done but nevertheless, real economic growth cannot be sustained with borrowed money.  
 
References 
Bernanke, Ben S., C. S. Lown, and B. M. Friedman, 1991, “The Credit Crunch,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Vol. 2, pp. 205–39 (Washington: Brookings Institution). 
Bongini, P., S. Claessens, and G. Ferri. 2001. “The Political Economy of Distress in East Asian Financial 
Institutions.” Journal of Financial Services Research 19(1): 5–25. 
Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 
2001, “Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?” Economic Policy, Vol. 32, pp. 51–82. 
Borensztein, Eduardo, and Jong-Wha Lee, 2002, “Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: Evidence 
from Firm-Level Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 853–75. 
Caprio, G., & Honohan, P., 1999, “Beyond Capital Ideals: Restoring Banking Stability”, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1999/12/30/000094946_99121405305211/
additional/116516322_20041117140033.pdf, Accessed 1
st
 November 2012 
Caprio, G. & Klingebiel, D., 1999, “Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises”, 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/Crisistableproduct.doc>, Accessed 1
st
 November 2012. 
Dollar, David, and Mary Hallward-Driemeier, 2000, “Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thai Industrial 
Firms,” The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, pp.1–22 (Washington: World Bank). 
Domaç, Ilker, and G. Ferri, 1999, “The Credit Crunch in East Asia: Evidence from Field Findings on Bank 
Behaviour and Policy Issues” (unpublished: Washington: World Bank). 
Gray, S. J., Salter, S. B., & Radebaugh, L. H., 2001, Global Accounting and Control: A Managerial 
Emphasis, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, U.S.A. 
Ghosh, Swati, and Atish Ghosh, 1999, “East Asia in the Aftermath: Was There a Crunch?,” Working Paper 
No. 99/38 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Goodhart, C., Hartmann, P., Llewellyn, D., Rojas-Suarez, L., & Weisbrod, S., 1998, Financial Regulation: 
Why, How and Where Now?, Routledge, 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE 
Heffernan, S., 1996, Modern Banking In Theory And Practice, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, England. 
Hempel, G. H., & Simonson, D. G., 1999, Bank Management Text And Cases, 5th ed., John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., U.S.A. 
Hoggarth, Glenn, Ricardo Reis, and Victoria Saporta, 2002, “Costs of Banking System Instability: Some 
Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 825–55. 
Honohan, Patrick, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2003, “The Fiscal Cost Implications of an Accommodating 
Approach to Banking Crises,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27, pp. 1539–60. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                           www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.10, 2012 
 
 
131 
 
Hooks, L. M., 1994, Bank Failures and Deregulation in the 1980s, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York & 
London. 
Kaufman, G. G., 1996, “Bank Failures, Systemic Risk and Bank Regulation”, 
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-2.html>, Accessed 1
st
 November 2012. 
Keefer, Phillip, 2001, “When do Special Interests Run Rampant? Disentangling the Role of Elections, 
Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises” (Washington: World Bank). 
Laeven, L. 1999. “Risk and Efficiency in East Asian Banks.” World Bank Working Paper No. 2255. 
Lindgren, Carl-Johan, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew Saal, 1996, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Scheme (NDIC) (2009) Annual Report  
Ogunleye G.A. (1993). Manifestations and Management of Distress in the Financial Services Industry. A 
paper presented at the Financial Institutions Training Centre‟s 2nd Bank Directors‟ Workshop held at the 
Lagos Sheraton Hotel. 
Okubadejo G, (2010) “How they killed Nigeria’s banks” AMG Professionals.  
Palubinskas, G. T., & Stough, R. R., 1999, “Common Causes Of Bank Failures In Post-Communist 
Countries”, <http://www.sba.muohio.edu/abas/1999/palubigi.pdf>, Accessed 1
st
 November 2012. 
Polizatto, Vincent P., “Strengthening the Auditing and Accounting Framework: Prudential Regulation and 
Banking Supervision”, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/PUBS/POLIZATT/poli001e.htm Accessed 1st 
November 2012. 
Selgin, G., 1996, Bank Deregulation and Monetary Order, Routledge, London EC4P 4EE. 
Spiegel, J., Gart, A., & Gart, S., 1996, Banking Redefined: How Superregional Powerhouses are Reshaping 
Financial Services, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Chicago. London. Singapore. 
Smith, C. R., & Walter, I., 1997, Global Banking, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York. 
Spollen, A. L., 1997, Corporate Fraud: The Danger from Within, Oak Tree Press, Ireland. 
White, L. H., 1993, The Crisis in American Banking, New York University Press, New York & London. 
White, L. H., 1999, The Theory of Monetary Institutions, Blackwell Publishers Inc., USA. & UK. 
DREA, (2009),  25 Biggest Bank Failures in History www.businesspundit.com/25-biggest-bank-failures 
Accessed 1st November 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
